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ABSTRACT 
Financialization is promoted by alliances of multilateral ‘development’ organisations, 
national governments, and owners and institutions of private capital. In the healthcare sector, 
the leveraging of private sources of finance is widely argued as necessary to achieve the 
Sustainable Development Goal 3 target of universal health coverage. Employing social 
science perspectives on financialization, we contend that this is a new phase of capital 
formation. We trace the antecedents, institutions, instruments and ideas that facilitated the 
penetration of private capital in this sector, and the emergence of new asset classes that 
distinguish it. We argue that this deepening of financialization represents a fundamental shift 
in the organizing principles for healthcare systems, with negative implications for health and 
equality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The contemporary landscape of development is marked by growing roles for private sources 
of finance. These are often justified as a necessary strategy to fill the estimated annual gap of 
USD 2.5 trillion required to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) globally; 
gaps considered beyond the capability of public financing (World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund, 2015). The quest for improving human wellbeing is now being re-framed 
around the notion of ‘unlocking the transformative potential’ of the private sector, and 
bilateral and multilateral organisations are increasingly expected to devote public funds to 
support that process (United Nations, 2015). But beyond the hyperbole of ‘innovation’ and 
‘leverage’, ‘disruption’ and ‘partnerships’, what are the structural features that enable this 
shift in roles and responsibilities? What institutions and instruments are facilitating it, and 
what do we know of its consequences?  
In this article we explore such questions though an examination of current trends in the 
financing and organisation of healthcare that situates these within a trajectory of capital 
formation – specifically the active attempts by state and non-state actors to accelerate and 
deepen financialization, creating new markets and opportunities for accumulation in the name 
of ‘development’ (Mawdsley et al., 2018). Health of populations is considered a prerequisite 
for sustainable development, and USD 371 billion annually is estimated as necessary to 
achieve targets for SDG3 alone, to ‘ensure healthy lives and promote wellbeing’ (Stenberg et 
al., 2017). While the aspirations set out in the targets for Goal 3 require many promotion and 
prevention actions in spheres well beyond healthcare, it is healthcare industries that are 
experiencing considerable growth (Deloitte, 2019) as global per capita spending on health 
increases 50% by 2030 with much of the growth concentrated in middle-income countries  
(Dieleman et al., 2017).  
It is within this scenario, and amidst a slowing in the growth of development assistance for 
health (Dieleman et al., 2017), that we are seeing a shift towards using public funds to 
facilitate private investment in healthcare companies through equity investments and loans. 
Up until 2006, just USD 0.4 billion was committed by bilateral and multilateral development 
finance institutions to private healthcare providers in the form of equity investments and 
loans. This rose to USD 1.9 billion for the period 2007 to 2015. Almost as much again (an 
estimated USD 1.7 billion) was committed over 2016 and 2017 alone (Hunter and Marriott, 
2018).  
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We will argue that an examination of the interaction between healthcare and a 
financialization-development nexus helps us to distinguish the distinctive nature of the latest 
emerging phase of health system change – that of the transformation of healthcare into 
saleable and tradeable assets for global investors. For our analysis we draw on policy 
documents, annual reports, online databases and media sources obtained through a 
‘snowballing’ approach, via searches of organisation websites and internet searches using 
Google. The internet searches used as keywords the names of specific investors and 
investment projects which were identified from organisation websites and from results of 
initial online searches that combined ‘health’ with terms such as ‘development financing’, 
‘innovative financing’, ‘private capital’, ‘equity investment’, ‘private finance initiative’ and 
‘impact bond’. We identify historical antecedents in the commercialization of healthcare 
provision, sketch out organisations and instruments that are facilitating the entry of private 
capital into healthcare, and consider its promotional apparatus and how it sits within a 
particular, functionalist, interpretation of the ambition of universal health coverage. We 
question the emergent discourse that private investment is the preferred and necessary route 
to improve health, and highlight population health and equity concerns. The paper concludes 
with a reflection on potential sites of critique and resistance towards financialization, and 
areas for further study. 
 
FINANCIALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT  
Financialization in its broadest sense is the ‘increasing role of financial motives, financial 
markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and 
international economies’ (Epstein, 2005: 3). Financialization creates new patterns of capital 
accumulation (Fine, 2012; Krippner, 2005) and shapes social institutions and subjectivities 
(G. F. Davis and Kim, 2015; van der Zwan, 2014), leading to new forms of social regulation 
(Storm, 2018), and resistance (G. F. Davis and Kim, 2015). 
The financialization-development nexus has come under scrutiny by critical social science 
researchers in the last few years (Mawdsley, 2016). These have pointed to a dissociation of 
financial returns from the productive economy (Fine, 2012), the cannibalization of the latter 
to serve the interests of finance (Storm, 2018), and the elevation of shareholder concerns over 
and above other issues such as social impact. Work on the financialization of food production 
associated with land-grabbing (Brooks, 2016; Clapp and Isakson, 2018) shows how in linking 
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the productive economy to the ebbs and flows of finance capital, basic needs like food are 
subjected to instability while entire sectors and regions are subordinated to the needs of 
financial markets. Commercially motivated actors may symbolically construct these sectors 
and regions as sites for investment (Fourcade, 2013; Mawdsley, 2016), but this discourse 
obfuscates the underlying dependency relationships, imperialism and geographically uneven 
development that are reproduced through investment and value creation processes (Bortz and 
Kaltenbrunner, 2018; Pike and Pollard, 2009; Rankin, 2013). 
Financialization is enacted through technologies that both individualize and collateralize new 
areas of life. This is demonstrated powerfully by the ways in which a global push towards 
‘financial inclusion’ has manifested in the rapid expansion of credit and other financial 
services (Mader, 2018). Loan-based technologies such as microfinance have opened up new 
opportunities for rent-seeking from the poor (Mader, 2014) while promoting indebtedness 
through individualized, racialized and gendered representations of entrepreneurship in the 
global South (Rankin, 2013; Soederberg, 2013). The individualized risks for engagement 
with finance can then be bundled together as asset-backed securities for trading in global 
financial markets (Lavinas, 2018).  
As observed by Fine (2012), it is not merely the expansion and proliferation of financial 
markets over the last 30 years that has been so striking but also the penetration of such 
financing into a widening range of social reproduction including housing, pensions and 
health. A recent Development and Change Forum Debate on financialization (Storm, 2018) 
explored a number of important aspects of this penetration and its consequences in social 
protection and personal finance. We aim to add to this with a close analysis of the healthcare 
sector. 
Most of the considerable ‘global health’ literature to date has been uncritical but a small 
critical body of work expresses concerns about volatility, amorality and opacity of private 
investment into global health (Stein and Sridhar, 2018), health-related bonds issued by 
GAVI, The Vaccine Alliance’s International Finance Facility for Immunisation (Mitchell and 
Sparke, 2016) and the World Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Facility (Erikson, 2015b). 
Erikson’s (2015a) analysis of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s Global Health 
Investment Fund for pharmaceuticals is an important example of investment fund scrutiny.  
These scholars point to a neglect of structural drivers for poor health – the limitations and 
inequities of existing health systems and global pharmaceutical markets and intellectual 
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property regimes – and the bypassing of domestic governments and regulatory regimes for 
pharmaceuticals (Erikson, 2015b). Relatively little research has been done so far on the 
practicalities of financialization in healthcare provision. Bayliss (2016) and Eren Vural 
(2017) have analysed processes, actors and sectoral effects in England and Turkey, 
respectively, demonstrating the value of detailed national analysis. They show deepening 
inequities, spiralling costs and market concentration. Here we situate those analyses within 
global trends for capital formation, highlighting the intersections with development finance.  
 
THE GROUNDWORK OF COMMERCIALIZATION IN HEALTHCARE 
The justification for promotion of private investment in social sectors has been fuelled by 
gaps in adequate resourcing of unified public systems. Healthcare is no exception. A lack of 
comprehensive healthcare infrastructure and inadequate numbers of healthcare workers has 
meant that physical access to healthcare has been inadequate in many countries and that 
technical quality has often been poor (Evans and Pablos-Méndez, 2016).  
The expansion of private financial capital in the healthcare sector was also made possible by 
proactive policies for commercialization. Prior to the 1993 intervention by the World Bank 
report on Investing in Health (World Bank, 1993), healthcare in many settings was delivered 
by a mix of government providers, a non-governmental not-for-profit (often faith-based) 
sector, or independent private practitioners and informal solo or family-based practitioners. 
There were relatively few commercial opportunities for larger formal for-profit organisations 
until reforms placing an ever-growing emphasis on market creation and cash income 
(Mackintosh and Koivusalo, 2005). The early stages of the process were marked by moratoria 
on expansion of public healthcare provision, the contracting out of ancillary services in public 
hospitals, and by introduction of user fee systems. Fees for healthcare became 
institutionalized and contributed to households’ descent into, and reproduction of, poverty 
(Krishna, 2010; McIntyre et al., 2006; Storeng et al., 2010), as well as human rights abuses 
such as forced detention in hospital for non-payment of bills (Yates et al., 2017). 
At the time that Investing in Health was published the reach of formal, for-profit health 
service provision had typically been limited to high-income groups (Bloom et al., 2013), but 
within a decade the presence of private capital had expanded across global health governance, 
financing and provision (O’Laughlin, 2016), under the rubric of ‘public-private partnerships’ 
(Richter, 2004), allowing access to many new loci for profit making. The Millennium 
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Development Goal era became characterized by ‘public-private partnerships’ across the 
health sector, encompassing corporate involvement in global public decision-making as part 
of corporate responsibility initiatives, and the contracting of private organisations to deliver 
public services (Richter, 2004). For more than a decade the partnership euphemism was 
employed to legitimise private profit in sectors that have substantial government presence 
(Richter, 2004; Standing, 2010), and invite transnational capital to influence global public 
policies (Richter, 2003). 
As recent work in this journal has demonstrated, a phase of corporate-oriented healthcare 
reforms transformed healthcare systems into profitable zones for global capital (Bayliss, 
2016; O’Laughlin, 2016; Qadeer and Baru, 2016). For three decades the ‘common-sense’ 
prevalent amongst much of the global health and development communities was that 
healthcare commercialization and the application of business methods was both inevitable 
and more efficient (Mackintosh and Koivusalo, 2005). Within healthcare organisations this 
perception was supported by the expansion of managerial and finance expertise (Mulligan, 
2016). The latest phase has extended these assumptions to include the greater use of private 
financial capital to expand healthcare infrastructure. Indeed loans with interest for this type of 
activity are being portrayed as morally superior to development aid ‘handouts’ on the 
grounds that that the latter address symptoms but not drivers of poverty (House of Commons 
International Development Committee, 2015).   
Private healthcare investments – by development finance institutions and others – have so far 
predominantly been made in large middle-income countries where the state has liberalized its 
regimes to allow private activity. For example private healthcare companies burgeoned in 
India after the federal government lifted national restrictions on foreign direct investment in 
hospitals in 2000, while the loosening of restrictions on foreign ownership of hospitals in 
China during the 12th and 13th five-year plan periods offers similar in-roads. In Turkey, a 
Health Transformation Plan launched in 2003 introduced a purchaser-provider split and 
mechanisms for public contracting of private providers, enabling that sector to grow and 
consolidate (Eren Vural, 2017; Yilmaz, 2017).  
 
‘PARTNERSHIP CAPITAL’ AND THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR 
HEALTHCARE FINANCIALIZATION 
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The new patterns of capital accumulation are situated in institutional trajectories that have 
permitted, and delivered, ever-deepening penetration of private finance. This is not particular 
to healthcare. Ouma (2016) makes a similar case in highlighting the policies and practices 
that permit and legitimize agri-finance capital formation, and its limited expansion beyond 
regions that have well-established agriculture markets. The relationship between development 
aid and financialization is important to an understanding of these contemporary changes as 
aid is used to transform new sectors and regions into investor-friendly asset classes and to de-
risk opportunities for private investment in those asset classes; an approach that sees private 
enterprise as the primary means to achieve economic growth (Mawdsley et al., 2018). 
Development organisations provide technical assistance for the creation of private investment 
projects such as private finance initiatives (Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge, 2017), and offer 
co-investments, loans and guarantees to de-risk investments. Development-themed bonds are 
perhaps the most significant emerging mechanism for using aid to draw in private investment, 
with new modalities including catastrophe bonds (Johnson, 2013) and impact bonds 
(Mawdsley, 2016).  
The World Bank’s private equity investment arm, the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), occupies a central role in this process, much as the World Bank has led the private turn 
in development financing generally. Between 1998 and 2013 the IFC committed USD 1.9 
billion in the health sector, including commitments for diagnostic chains, health insurers, 
information technology and medical education (IFC, 2013b). Its health and education 
commitments (grouped together in IFC annual reports as ‘consumer and social services’) had 
increased from 2 per cent of its overall investment portfolio in 2007, to 8 per cent in 2015 
(IFC, 2007, 2016). The IFC’s reports Business of Health in Africa (2008) and Landscape of 
Inclusive Business Models of Healthcare in India (2014) championed private financing to 
expand corporate healthcare chains, and the organisation has facilitated private finance 
initiatives for healthcare infrastructure (IFC, 2013a). Companies in receipt of IFC 
investments had 142 million healthcare users by 2017, and the IFC aimed to increase this 
eight-fold by 2030 (IFC, 2017c). A recent article by a principal equity specialist at the IFC 
noted health to be one of their best performing sectors in terms of returns on investment 
(Mirza, 2018). 
Other multilateral development banks have made investments on a smaller scale, as have 
government-owned institutions. The former include the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank and African Development Bank, 
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while the latter include US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), France’s 
Société de Promotion et de Participation pour la Coopération Economique (Proparco), 
Germany’s Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG) and UK’s CDC 
Group.1  
The investments in healthcare companies made by development finance institutions can be 
understood as part of their extended role to ‘escort’ private finance into development (Carroll 
and Jarvis, 2014). While promoting private capital flows as part of development aid activities 
is not new, it has become much more central in the era of SDGs (Van Waeyenberge, 2015). 
The 2015 Addis Ababa Agenda on financing for development, for example, emphasized the 
need to use public funds to support and expand privately financed and owned infrastructure 
(United Nations, 2015). Others have preferred to refer to this processes as a ‘leveraging’ of 
the private sector (World Bank and International Monetary Fund, 2015) or a ‘catalysis’ 
process (IFC, 2016).  
Public and private actors of various stripes have pushed for these moves, creating alliances of 
multinational organisations, national governments and owners of private capital; operating as 
a single epistemic community (Yilmaz, 2017). Lefebvre (2010) points to the collaborative 
efforts to deregulate healthcare investment in India that brought together the World Bank, 
national and state governments, domestic banks, and industry representatives, including the 
Confederation of Indian Industries and the physician-owners of hospital chains themselves. In 
Turkey, the Justice and Development Party’s Health Transformation Programme, supported 
by the World Bank, appealed simultaneously to the urban poor and private hospital owners 
by expanding public health insurance to allow purchasing of services from private healthcare 
providers (Yilmaz, 2017). In so doing it stimulated rapid expansion in investment and 
capacity in private healthcare provision, and subsequent market concentration (Eren Vural, 
2017). More recently, the national government’s programme to construct 25 ‘health 
campuses’ using private finance initiatives (lenders include EBRD, IFC, OPIC and a suite of 
private organisations) speaks less to the commercial interests of private healthcare providers 
and more to those of investment, real estate, construction and medical technology industries.  
Another alliance, the steering committee for the IFC’s Business of Health in Africa report, 
comprised the Gates Foundation, a former Minister of Health in Nigeria and the founder of 
                                                          
1 CDC Group was originally named the Colonial Development Corporation, which was then changed to the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation. The organisation is now known simply as CDC Group. 
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South Africa-based healthcare multinational, Netcare. The Gates Foundation is a private actor 
with considerable global influence that is frequently to be found supporting such initiatives; it 
part-funded the IFC report, has made equity investments in Africa Health Systems 
Management’s Investment Fund for Health in Africa, supported expansion of corporate-led 
development (McGoey, 2012) and has taken a lead role in the Global Health Investment Fund 
(Erikson, 2015a). Netcare is lead partner for a consortium awarded an IFC-brokered private 
finance initiative contract with the Lesotho government for the construction and management 
of the Queen Mamohato Memorial Hospital; the project attracted worldwide attention for 
locking the government into a contract with high costs (Oxfam, 2014). 
The emergence of wealthy owners of capital looking to expand their influence as 
‘development partners’ is revealing of the opportunities afforded by development financing. 
Abraaj Capital was briefly a leading fund manager and investor in middle-income country 
healthcare sectors (Hunter and Marriott, 2018) before foundering on allegations of misuse 
over its USD 1 billion Growth Markets Health Fund (S. Clark et al., 2018), Abraaj’s founder, 
Arif Naqvi had claimed status as a ‘thought leader’ by championing the concept of 
‘partnership capital’ – in the form of public and multilateral loan guarantees and risk 
mitigation for equity companies – as a solution for many of the world’s problems including 
climate change and droughts (Naqvi, 2016). Such claims seem at odds with Abraaj’s 
investments in oil companies such as Kuwait Energy, Byco and PetroTiger, but nonetheless 
Navqi joined the United Nations Global Compact as a Board Member. Parts of Abraaj’s 
Growth Markets Health Fund portfolio have since been assimilated by TPG Capital’s Rise 
Fund (Kalesh and Shah, 2018), founded in 2016 by TPG’s Bill McGlashan, along with 
former President of eBay Jeff Skoll, and rock star venture capitalist Bono. In a sign of 
deepening ties between these private investors and development organisations, IFC and CDC 
Group recently joined with TPG to launch an Investors for Health initiative promoting private 
investment in the health sector. 
The association of development financing with profit reflects a longer trend of reciprocal 
benefits in the aid sector that is reflected in the institutions of bilateral/multilateral aid 
(Sogge, 2002) corporate social responsibility (Herrick, 2009) and philanthropy (McGoey, 
2012). What seems to have changed in the current iteration is the acceptance of an argument 
that private profit and self-interest are somehow necessary for development (McGoey, 2012). 
Navqi’s ‘partnership capital’ reflected this shift towards overt profit-making for ostensibly 
philanthropic work.  
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NEW ASSET CLASSES FOR HEALTHCARE FINANCIALIZATION  
‘Investing in health’ means creating opportunities for profitable investments in the health 
sector (Qadeer and Baru, 2016). Privately financed projects in the healthcare sector to date 
have sought to expand existing healthcare facilities or construct new ones, and the facilities 
either pass to public ownership as in ‘private finance initiatives’, possibly with contracted 
private sector management, or remain in private ownership. Healthcare financialization 
represents a new phase of capital formation that builds on, but is distinctive from, previous 
rounds of privatization and neoliberal healthcare reform and this is manifested in the creation 
of new asset classes. In this section we highlight three instruments that perform this 
‘mundane work’ of financialization (Mawdsley, 2016), transforming population ill-health 
into zones for investment and creating saleable commodities that can be traded by domestic 
and transnational private capital: private healthcare companies, private finance initiatives for 
healthcare infrastructure, and impact bonds. 
Privately owned chains of hospitals and clinics receive loans and investments to serve their 
expansion within middle-income countries or relatively wealthy enclaves in low-income 
countries. They generally follow one of two business models. The first model is characterized 
by high user fees and aims to support high-end healthcare consumption by aspiring and 
wealthier segments of the domestic and global population, and to feed into development of a 
private insurance market. The second focuses on the ‘bottom of the pyramid’; a concept that 
emerged in the business world during the 2000s as model for generating revenue by selling 
products and services to poorer groups in society (Prahalad, 2004). In healthcare, ‘bottom of 
the pyramid’ models are based on Fordist high-throughput approaches that minimize costs 
and maximize economies of scale (IFC, 2013c) and that look to a future of government 
subsidies to cover costed packages of basic care for poorer groups who cannot afford their 
fees.  
Private finance initiatives have been used to backload the construction costs for public 
healthcare facilities in the global North since the 1990s (McKee et al., 2006), and are 
introduced on the premise that they provide vital healthcare infrastructure and may in some 
cases offer predictability in payments (Hellowell, 2016). The high overall costs of these 
arrangements compared to government borrowing has led to increasing criticism within and 
beyond the healthcare sector in those settings, as discussed in a later section, however a 
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global South revival of the private finance initiative model is being championed by the IFC 
(Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge, 2017). 
Impact bonds are a nascent asset class in the healthcare sector, with investors providing up-
front financing that is returned by outcome funders (usually governmental and philanthropic 
organisations) based on performance. Examples from low- and middle-income countries 
include projects to build International Committee of the Red Cross centres for physical 
rehabilitation in Congo, Mali and Nigeria, and a quality improvement programme for 
maternity services in private hospitals in India (Social Finance, 2018). A recently announced 
Cameroon Cataract Performance Bond attracted USD 2 million for the construction of a high-
throughput eye care facility in Cameroon, although negotiations to convince OPIC to become 
the lead investor led to a bond agreement that appears to absolve OPIC of almost any 
financial risk as the entire investment principal will be returned plus 4 per cent interest even 
in the event of project implementers not meeting targets, with an interest rate of 8 per cent if 
targets are met (Oroxom et al., 2018). 
Investment platforms and fund managers occupy a central role in the development of 
healthcare asset classes. They enable investors to pool resources and spread risk, transform 
fixed infrastructure into investor-friendly assets and mediate relationships across regulatory 
regimes (Searle, 2018). Alliances of state and non-state actors including the IFC and Gates 
Foundation have been pivotal in developing intermediary investment funds, for example 
those focused on health sectors in African countries (Marriott and Hamer, 2014), and follow 
on from more than a decade of ‘emerging market’ investment funds that occupy practical and 
performative roles in financialization (Fourcade, 2013). The use of intermediary funds, many 
of which are registered in tax havens such as Mauritius and the Cayman Islands, provides 
additional opportunities for rent extraction by companies that manage and audit the funds and 
associated legal work, with little transparency and accountability (Hunter and Marriott, 2018)  
The framing of healthcare infrastructure as an asset class reflects wider attempts to find 
commercial value in social sectors. Infrastructure projects are structured into packages with 
the most lucrative offered to private investors and for global trading. Smaller projects may be 
bundled together to attract larger commercial investors which, as Bayliss and Van 
Waeyenberge (2017) note, is driving a standardization of private finance initiative processes, 
regardless of the sector involved and implications for service provision. There are similar 
hopes amongst industry representatives that impact bonds will eventually be traded in bond 
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markets, but as Mawdsley (2016) notes the complexity and cost of their novel 
commodification system which has hampered more widespread use. Meanwhile the 
expansion of universal health coverage insurance schemes provides mechanisms for public 
subsidy of private profit-seeking activity and functions as a state-backed security for rent 
extraction by finance capital, akin to that offered by conditional cash transfers (Lavinas, 
2018). Whereas personal credit is secured by social protection policies such as cash transfers 
that ensure a regular stream of income, hospital debt is secured using state-backed health 
insurance that ensures steady streams of healthcare users and revenue.  
Generating templates and success stories for replication is likely to be key to expanding these 
asset classes. The announcement in 2010 of the Turkish government’s plan to build 25 health 
campuses using private finance initiatives was soon followed by selection of Istanbul as the 
venue for the IFC’s 2013 biennial Global Private Health Conference, themed Making Global 
Connections: Leading Change in Emerging Health Markets. The Cameroon impact bond 
project explicitly draws inspiration from the Aravind healthcare chain in India (OPIC, 2017), 
which has been heavily touted for a decade by development organisations as an inclusive and 
reproducible commercial model for healthcare provision (IFC, 2014) and which indicates the 
importance of longer-term marketing efforts in the financialization-development nexus. 
 
RHETORICAL RE-CONSTRUCTION OF INVESTMENT MARKETS 
The promotional apparatus that facilitates this new world view about what population health 
requires, and brings it to governments, is considerable and well-versed. Development finance 
institutions have worked alongside a range of corporate and non-corporate actors to promote 
healthcare systems as sites for generating returns on investment. The Big Four financial 
auditors and Big Three management consultancies produce many reports that highlight 
market ‘opportunities’ in healthcare, for example, McKinsey published Healthcare in China: 
‘Entering uncharted waters’ in 2012 followed by KPMG’s Commercial Opportunities in the 
Primary Care Market in China in 2016. Other reports present stories of successful businesses 
to encourage investment and liberalization in the sector. Deloitte produced the IFC’s 2014 
Landscape of Inclusive Business Models of Healthcare in India report and KPMG’s 2014 
global healthcare conference was followed by a report entitled Staying Power: Success 
stories in global healthcare. PricewaterhouseCoopers has sponsored a series of case study 
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reports on private finance initiatives in the healthcare sector, including a review of projects in 
Latin America (Llumpo et al., 2015).  
Through these activities, healthcare systems in the global South are re-imagined as 
marketplaces for investors to engage with. It is an activity that development finance 
institutions have been keen to emphasize and reflects the contemporary development trend in 
which entire sectors and countries are labelled ‘emerging’ and ‘frontier’ markets to encourage 
investment (Fourcade, 2013; IFC, 2017a; Mawdsley, 2016). These rhetorical devices enable 
interested actors to construct a future of prosperity and investment growth (Beckert, 2013; 
Thrift, 2001) and the value of financial products such as shares in healthcare companies is 
driven by these imagined futures (G. Clark et al., 2004).  
In healthcare, the imagined future driving investment draws explicitly on the growing burden 
of chronic diseases and the somewhat increased capacity of ‘middle-classes’ to pay for 
healthcare. People facing a life-time of debilitating diseases are presented as resources to be 
exploited:  
‘There has never been a more exciting time to be an investor in health in emerging 
markets. Rising incomes in developing countries are propelling rapid growth of 
demand for health goods and services, while disruptive technologies and innovation is 
creating new ways of meeting this demand. Meanwhile, the growing prevalence of 
non-communicable diseases like cancer, heart disease, and diabetes is upending 
perceptions of the needs for health in developing countries. Developed and 
developing countries alike are struggling to cope with the high cost of these diseases, 
in terms of lost lives, lost productivity, infrastructure financing, and the human capital 
required to treat them.’  
IFC Head for Health and Education in the inaugural issue of the organisation’s 
healthcare newsletter Private healthcare in emerging markets: an investor’s 
perspective (IFC, 2015). 
The attractiveness of healthcare to commercial actors is similarly bluntly presented in the 
business press. A South African fund management company representative quoted in 
Bloomberg (McClelland, 2016), states: ‘The economics behind AIDS and HIV can be 
lucrative because treatment requires not only medicines but also nutritional requirements […] 
there are opportunities through the value chain from wholesalers all the way to distributors’. 
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Hospital managers, and an emerging corpus of ‘social entrepreneur’ physicians (Martin, 
2014), often play a key role in legitimising these constructions through their active support 
for investment and the infrastructure expansion that comes with it, sometimes attracting 
significant personal status and wealth in the process. Founders of hospital chains are 
described by the business press as ‘visionary’ (IFC, 2011: 6; Kemperman et al., 2016: 392), 
with frequent mention made to personal Entrepreneur of the Year awards conferred by 
financial newspapers and the World Economic Forum.  
At the same time, individual citizens are invited to organize their daily lives through active 
individual risk management, and engage with financial markets through purchase of loans 
and insurance. Like microfinance loans, health insurance packages have been marketed 
globally as a way to manage the financial risks, in this case the risk of ill-health, with vocal 
support for expansion of commercial insurance coming from the World Bank and the private 
investment industry (Averill and Marriott, 2013; Birn et al., 2016). These packages not only 
provide new flows for revenue extraction by insurance companies and their investors, but 
also offer protection for existing flows. For example, SKS made its microfinance loans for 
low-income clients in India conditional on the purchase of an SKS private health insurance 
product (Banerjee et al., 2014). Financialization has created a new subjectivity: the ‘investing 
subject’ – the ‘autonomous individual who insures himself against the risks of the life cycle 
through financial literacy and self-discipline’ (Aitken, 2007: 13, quoted in van der Zwan 
2014). 
 
THE CURIOUS BED-FELLOWS OF FINANCIALIZATION AND UNIVERSAL 
HEALTH COVERAGE 
The concept of ‘universal health coverage’ is a recurring theme in the documents that support 
private finance in the healthcare sector, just as ‘financial inclusion’ features prominently in 
the extension of financial services to low-income communities (Mader, 2018). In this 
scenario the right to population health and its array of promotive, preventive, primary and 
curative services becomes displaced by a much more restricted right to healthcare ‘coverage’ 
(Birn et al., 2016; O’Laughlin, 2016; Qadeer and Baru, 2016). And so, despite growing 
knowledge of the social, political and commercial drivers of poor health, the SDG target to 
achieve universal health coverage by 2030 becomes widely interpreted as necessitating 
significant expansion in healthcare infrastructure and insurance. 
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Dominant healthcare financing models in different countries may mediate the impact of 
financialization, and ‘universal health coverage’ is a broad enough term to incorporate a 
range of publicly managed financing arrangements but is in practice characterized by 
concerted efforts to promote models of healthcare financing based on ‘affordable’ user fees 
and health insurance, and on expansion of privately owned healthcare infrastructure (World 
Bank, 2016). Mexico’s voluntary health insurance system – Seguro Popular – has been held 
up as a role model for achieving universal health coverage (Frenk et al., 2019) as it offers to 
finance basic healthcare services for previously uninsured groups. However, by offering 
coverage for a more limited set of healthcare services than other insurers, for example 
excluding services for diabetes-related illness, Seguro Popular reinforces social divisions in 
an already fragmented healthcare system (Birn et al., 2016). 
Until recently, development finance institutions had made the case for equity investments and 
loans in the healthcare sector on the basis of job creation (Hunter and Murray, 2015), but 
‘UHC’ is fast becoming a preferred justification for their activities. The concept was invoked 
by the IFC in the run up to its 2017 Global Private Health Conference (IFC, 2017b), and by 
CDC Group (2017). Commercial actors quickly saw the promotional benefits: KPMG has 
established a Center for Universal Health Coverage; Abraaj cited universal health coverage as 
necessitating its commercial investments (Abraaj Group, 2017); and technology company 
Philips employs the concept when promoting its investments and technology packages on 
development media platform Devex (Devex and Philips, 2017). Such developments indicate 
that the concept now occupies a central role in justifications for the financialization of 
healthcare.  
The shifting rhetoric around private capital and universal health coverage reflects the arrival 
of an implementation phase for the SDGs, where aspirational goals are operationalized as 
policies with time-bound targets and costed financing gaps (Stenberg et al., 2017). Like the 
Millennium Development Goals before them, there is an impetus for quick gains using 
technologies that bypass systemic problems such as under-resourced public healthcare 
systems and for portrayal of these systemic problems as themselves requiring technical 
intervention (Storeng, 2014), usually incorporating contracts for commercial actors. Private 
investment in healthcare provision and financing is now presented as the only solution for 
addressing geographic gaps in healthcare provision, high mortality, and catastrophic out-of-
pocket expenditures. As recently noted in a report produced by KPMG and academic 
researchers on behalf of the World Innovation Summit for Health, achieving universal health 
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coverage by 2030 ‘is too ambitious to be achieved without leveraging existing private 
capacity, investment and innovation’ (Roland et al., 2018). 
 
SOCIETAL AND HEALTH EFFECTS OF ‘INVESTING IN HEALTH’ 
Davis and Kim (2015)’s review of the sociological literature makes a key point that 
financialization not only represents a power shift from industrial corporations to the financial 
sector but also a shift from social institutions to markets as the dominant organizing principle. 
While the narrative around healthcare investment seems to imply that investors, 
entrepreneurial physicians and investing subjects work in the interests of population health 
and healthcare systems, a private investment-fuelled expansion of these healthcare provision 
models raises important questions about the decline of healthcare systems as social 
institutions and the implications for equity. The expansion of privately financed projects is 
primarily a commercial venture to which population health is a secondary, indeed sometimes 
a contradictory, consideration. Increased access to diagnostics plus ever more costly 
treatments have become the principle response to meet an epidemic of chronic illnesses that 
are fuelled by demographic and epidemiological changes and by the dominance of 
commercial interests over health concerns in the food, drink, transport, agriculture and 
manufacturing sectors (Buse et al., 2017; Popkin et al., 2012; Swinburn et al., 2019; World 
Health Organization, 2015).  
The effects in the shorter term include health and financial risks, as well as longer term 
inequity and social segmentation. An emphasis on value creation for investors encourages 
outsourcing (G. F. Davis and Kim, 2015) and distorts healthcare provision to maximize 
profitability, undermining health and increasing the drain on the public purse and depleting 
family resources. Healthcare professionals in corporately owned hospitals, for example, face 
overt and implicit incentives to increase revenue (Nundy et al., 2018) which manifest in many 
settings with over-testing, over-diagnosis and unnecessary treatments (Morgan et al., 2015). 
Unexpectedly high rates of CT/MRI scans, caesarean section births, hysterectomies and 
cardiac surgeries appear to be a growing problem in low- and middle-income countries 
(Brownlee et al., 2017). Unjustified surgical procedures have particularly important negative 
implications for health, including risk of subsequent infection, cardiovascular problems and 
death.  
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The financial burden of healthcare can either lead to additional costs for governments who try 
to provide insurance cover, or can push service users into outright poverty. Each year an 
estimated 100 million people are forced below the USD 1.90-a-day poverty line by out-of-
pocket healthcare expenditure (World Health Organization and International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 2017). In countries such as Bangladesh and India large 
out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures are disproportionately due to costs of care in the 
private sector (Kanjilal et al., 2008; Rahman et al., 2013), and yet many of the companies 
expanding with support from development finance institutions, including the ‘base-of-the-
pyramid’ models, are corporate enterprises offering fee-based care that must be purchased by 
out-of-pocket payments or private health insurance.  
Perhaps the most significant meso-level change taking place now is the drift towards 
acceptance and normalization of healthcare markets, commercial imperatives and of 
segmented healthcare systems. Population groups, geographic areas, and policy areas such as 
public health that are deemed unprofitable can be neglected unless further public subsidies 
can be obtained in the form of insurance programmes or ‘public-private partnerships’ 
(Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge, 2017). One motivator for governments to pursue the 
infrastructure that will service segmented healthcare systems is engagement with the global 
healthcare economy and related service sectors. Turkey’s ‘health campus’ projects appear to 
be targeted as much at competing for international medical travel as at meeting the needs of 
domestic communities (Rosca, 2016). Similar state government initiatives in India have 
incentivised large healthcare complexes (‘medicities’), some located in special economic 
zones, to attract healthcare tourists (Murray et al., 2016).  
Of particular concern is the way in which the segmented systems that are being expanded 
reject single risk pools for healthcare and the redistribution of wealth needed for social 
solidarity and equitable healthcare access (Mulligan, 2016), undermining universalism in 
healthcare (Birn et al., 2016). Recent research demonstrates the role of finance in shaping 
pharmaceutical and private health insurance industries and their decision-making. Burlage 
and Anderson have described how private investment in pharmaceutical industries is 
associated with a business strategy that eschews research and development in favour of 
acquiring other companies (and their patents) and gouging prices (Burlage and Anderson, 
2018). Mulligan’s anthropological study of a health insurance company in Puerto Rico shows 
how private health insurance is characterized by shareholder value maximization strategies 
that are introduced and driven by finance experts in the insurance companies (Mulligan, 
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2016). Companies hide and offload costs while de-pooling and individualising risk and 
responsibility through segmented (risk-adjusted) pricing for premiums. The nature of effects 
are industry-specific, so similar pressures in the care sector have manifested in the erosion of 
wages and employment conditions for frontline workers who have limited access to collective 
organisation for resistance (Horton, 2017). 
Segmented national healthcare systems are highly inequitable, and Chile provides an example 
of how, despite achieving ‘coverage’ on healthcare indicators, such system arrangements fail 
the poorer sections of society and terminally undermines the quality of public provision. The 
Chilean military government of the 1970s was one of the first to seek to reduce public 
spending and encourage market solutions by actively creating two parallel and separately 
funded ‘sub-systems’ of healthcare provision in which the private system primarily served the 
needs of the wealthy and healthy males with salaries and incentivised private insurance plans. 
The over-stretched public system was left to deal with the remaining majority of the 
population, and with the complex problems of poverty and chronic disease, while struggling 
to retain the specialist doctors that they train given the insufficient investment, long waiting 
lists and heavy workloads. The private sector has been quick to exploit the new market 
opportunities. Private hospital infrastructure has multiplied in urban areas as public funds are 
re-routed to purchase (with user co-payments) its packages of care in selected profitable areas 
with high bed occupancy and rapid throughput such as maternity care. It is a cycle that fuels 
healthcare industry expansion, perpetuates specialist flight, deprives the public sector further 
of funds, and jeopardises the quality of care in rural and poor urban areas (Murray and Elston, 
2005; Rotarou and Sakellariou, 2017; Siebert, 2015). Countries now pursuing private 
investment-fuelled infrastructure expansion are likely to experience similar trajectories. 
Meanwhile trends towards greater concentration of ownership in the healthcare provision 
sector suggest a growing public reliance on the resources of a small number of corporately 
owned chains that are driven by shareholder concern with dividends and company value, with 
serious long-term implications for costs and regulation. Healthcare companies are pursuing 
acquisitions and fast rates of growth in the number of facilities to increase company value. In 
Turkey this has led to rapid expansion and concentration in the private healthcare sector 
(Eren Vural, 2017), and other commentators have pointed to similar trends for concentration 
in India (Chakravarthi et al., 2017) and South Africa (Munyai, 2018) – countries that have 
been the focus of ‘leveraging’ efforts by development finance institutions. The search for new 
markets has also encouraged transnational activity and middle-income countries in Eastern 
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and Western Africa are attracting particular attention (Mohandas, 2016). Little attention is 
being paid to the ways in which expansion and consolidation by these companies is ‘locking 
in’ particular models for healthcare provision and financing. The influence of these chains in 
domestic politics makes it a trend that is difficult to reverse (Dreze and Sen, 2013: Ch. 6).  
The use of private finance initiatives to expand public healthcare infrastructure offers little 
consolation given their relative high cost to the public purse compared to other forms of 
financing (Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge, 2017), and long-term escalation of costs has been 
documented in a rapidly growing body of literature from the global North (Pollock, 2005; 
Whiteside, 2015) and the global South (Webster, 2015). Increasingly public organisations in 
those countries are trying to extricate themselves from private finance initiatives, with mixed 
success (J. Davis et al., 2015), and a global coalition of non-governmental organisations has 
called on the World Bank and other development organisations to stop promoting such 
models (Eurodad, 2017). 
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS  
Other scholars have interrogated the recent history of capital relations in healthcare (for 
example O’Laughlin, 2016). Our analysis advances this by charting the contours of an 
emerging financialized phase. In this article we offer a de-construction of financialization in 
healthcare that enables us to see current developments situated within wider patterns of 
capital formation. We highlight the antecedents, institutions, instruments and ideas that 
facilitate the process and we argue that the transformation of healthcare into a set of saleable 
and tradeable assets has built on four decades of healthcare commercialization that has 
deregulated activities to enable profitable investment and provision. This latest phase is 
characterized by a ‘common-sense’ policy position amongst many governments and bilateral 
and multilateral development agencies that enormous volumes of private financial capital are 
necessary for promoting development in the healthcare sphere, and by the development of 
new asset classes. Closer scrutiny reveals alliances of domestic and transnational private 
capital using highly selective representations of ‘development’ to favour healthcare models 
that permit the extraction of revenue from situations of vulnerability. 
As a consequence healthcare markets are being formed with little regard for effects on health 
and equity. Corporate provision of healthcare, for example, is promoted as offering high 
quality and affordable care as either a transitional or permanent contributor to achievement of 
21 
 
universal health coverage. Yet there are important reasons to be sceptical about this narrative 
and the effects of a corporate-oriented transformation in healthcare systems. The proposed 
infrastructure expansion and the focus on profitable treatment of illnesses or related 
diagnostic services has inherent problems that stem from the need to generate revenue or 
capital growth for the benefit of investors. Similarly, problems arise from the roll-out of 
insurance models that rely on unbundling of risk, or that aim to generate profit from 
government commitments to provide in-patient care. Many provide regular income for the 
private healthcare sector and aid the penetration of the insurance industry in the health sector, 
and they contribute to locking in models of healthcare that undermine social solidarity and 
redistribution of wealth, and that divert public funds from more progressive health promotion 
activities such as public health interventions. 
The euphoria of the buzz, and buzzwords, of financialization have begun to permeate some 
potential sites where critique and resistance might have been be anticipated, and private 
investment in healthcare is fast-becoming an unquestioned policy in global health. Organisers 
of a leading biennial global health systems conference – the Global Symposium on Health 
Systems Research – chose to set up the differing views on private sector engagement for 
provision and financing as a conflict between ‘pragmatism’ and ‘polemic’, thus leaving little 
invitation to critical analyses (Health Systems Global, 2018). Public health and higher 
education institutions, themselves now subject to the same financial imperatives which 
circulate in healthcare provision, have embraced new opportunities to be contracted by 
investor groups to conduct research that will support the fine-tuning of investment activities 
and bolster their gravitas and feel-good image. The commissioning of a prestigious academic 
research group by CDC Group to help produce an evaluation template for their healthcare 
investments reflects a recent trend for public health academics to conduct market-related 
research for spin-off third-party ‘initiatives’ funded by commercial interests that might 
otherwise be performed by commercial consultancy agencies.  
However organized resistance has also emerged, in particular from civil society alliances. 
Analyses, lobbying and campaigns by the People’s Health Movement (2017), the global trade 
union federation Public Services International (Lethbridge, 2016) and Oxfam (Averill and 
Marriott, 2013; Oxfam, 2014) figure among these. Such alliances also connect to networks of 
non-governmental organisations and academics concerned with a private turn in development 
finance (Eurodad, 2017; Gabor et al., 2018). In some settings healthcare professional 
associations have attempted to stall reforms that permit commercialization and financial 
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capital-fuelled private healthcare expansions (Iriart, 2005; Yilmaz, 2017), in others, groups of 
professionals are organising through national and international networks such as the 
Community of Practitioners on Accountability and Social Action in Health (COPASAH). In a 
few cases in Latin America, such as Bolivia and El Salvador, national governments have also 
acted to overcome industry opposition to introduce legislation that rolls back 
commercialization and expands healthcare entitlements (People’s Health Movement et al., 
2014). 
Inspiration for further scholarly contribution can be drawn from the burgeoning body of 
social science studies on financialization (Bayliss et al., 2016; G. F. Davis and Kim, 2015; 
Storm, 2018), and we see opportunities for interdisciplinary research to generate critical 
insights through detailed analysis of processes for identifying investment targets and 
engaging investors. Processes of financialization have permeated social reproduction 
worldwide, driving public policy and providing lucrative returns for finance capital. It is clear 
that the current shift towards private finance in development risks diverting attention away 
from core principles of equity and social justice, away from the possibilities for creating de-
commodified zones in social reproduction, and towards profitable projects and greater 
inequality. Research that further examines the actors, processes and effects of the 
financialization-development nexus will be key to unravelling the pervasiveness of the 
narrative of private finance solutions to public problems. 
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